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STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ANID THE
PLAIN -MEANING RULE
It cannot be disputed that statutory law is increasing, and
as a natural result the approach of the courts to the problem of
interpretation is becoming more important each day It isobvious that the difficulties of lawyer and layman alike, m understanding and complying with statutes which affect their problems and activities, are and will be increasingly aggravated unless
the courts arrive at some consistent and uniform method of
statutory interpretation.
At the timS of the enactment of any statute, the legislature
has available an unlimited reservoir of words and phrases capable of expressing in plain, everyday language any purpose or
intent'it may have in mind relative to the subject matter. Further, it is presumed to have at least a general knowledge of existing law on the subject and must certainly have a clear understanding of the situation to be dealt with and the result to be
accomplished. Finally, it is specifically charged with the duty
and responsibility, and is vested with the exclusive constitutional power, to enact legislation. Logically, then, the courts
should apply statutory law precisely as it is written, rather than
as they think it should have been written, or even as they tlunk
it was intended to be written.'
The ideal type of "team work" between courts and legislatures
toward which the writer believes all concerned should aim was
exemplified more than once in New York when Cardozo, J. sat on its
highest bench.
For example, in Hoadley v. Hoadley, 244 N.Y. 424, 155 N.E. 728,
733, decided in 1927, that eminent judge, after holding that the court
could not extend the remedies provided by statute where the legislature had intended to make such remedies exclusive, discussed considerations which would justify the provision of additional remedies,
and stated, "Considerations such as these may suggest an amendment of the statute that will extend the right of action.
Our concern at this time is with the statute as enacted." The statute m question was amended the following year by the New York Legislature
along the lines suggested by the Court. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT, sec.
1137 (1928 Amend.)
Again, in Manhattan Co. v Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150 N.E. 594,
599, decided in 1926, Cardozo, J. stated, "There is force m the argument that wider freedom of choice through the spontaneous flowerings of custom would work a social,.gain. One of the debit items to
be charged against codifying statutes is the possibility of reterfer-
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The primary rule of interpretation of statutes is, however,
traditionally stated as being to give effect to the -intention of the

law-making body

2

So stated, the rule is disarmingly simple,.

but, in applying it, it is difficult if not impossible to find any
consistent theory of statutory interpretation in the decisions-of
the courts. The canons of statutory construction and the traditional rulesof-interpretation are far too numerous to berelated
here. 3 It is not the present purpose to discuss them in detail, but
rather to suggest an approach to the general problem 'which 'it
is believed will be practical as well as beneficial. Briefly, it an-.
volves the acceptance of the "plain meaning rule" as the, basic
principle to guide the courts in interpreting and applving the'
eiiactments of the law-making branch.
The term, "plain meaning rule," is herein used 'in a somewhat special sense which requires explanation. It starts with the
proposition already stated, that, logically, courts sholild apply
statutory law precisely as it is written. But a cou'cessibn is made
to legal tradition in cases where the written words do not in fact
have a plain meaning. In such cases, effect may be given 'to
legislative intent where that intent is unmistakably clear from a
reading of the statute as a whole or where, if it is not thus made
clear, a review of the legislative history leaves no legitimate or
reasonable doubt whatever as to that intent. Thus, not only is it
not intended here to argue for the abolition of such existing
canons of construction as those which, for example, permit the
courts to make allowance for typographical errors and .the like,
ence with evolutionary growth. It is the ancient conflict between
flexibility and certainty. So far as the Negotiable Instruments Law
is concerned, the remedy for the evil, if it be one, is an amendment
of the statute that will add to the negotiable instruments there
enumerated or described, such other classes as the law merchant or
the custom of the market may from time to time establish. Until
such an amendment shall be adopted, the courts in their decisions
must take for granted that the Legislature is content with the law
as it is written." The same year, the New York Legislature adopted
the amendment which the Court's opinion indicated was desirable.
LAws 1926, ch. 704.
2Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 236 U.S.
549, 59 L.Ed. 713, 35 Sup. Ct. 289 (1915)
Phillips v. Pope's Heirs,
49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 163 (1849), SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1891) secs. 234, 235.
'Reference may be made to SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1891) Passim, for detailed discussion.
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but the concession goes further. Provided the legislative intent is
unmistakable, provided it is wholly consistent with the wording
of the statute, and provided the proposed extended application of
the literal scope of that wording is clearly demanded by such intent, it is conceded that courts may extend the application of a
giveni statute to related situations not precisely covered by its
terms, at least in those cases where the statute is of such nature
that traditionally it would have been subject to "liberal construction."
However, it must be recognized that indulgence by the
courts in "judicial legislation," where interpretation of statutes
is involved, is bad simply because it usurps the basic legislative
function and is contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers.
It is bad also-and this is perhaps yet more fundamental-because the mere possibility that it may be indulged in (and
a fortior. the realization of that possibility in the particular instance) introduces a highly subjective, uncertain, uncontrollable,
unpredictable, and, it is submitted, unnecessary, proviso into
every enacted law.
In general, there are said to be two basic methods of statutory construction, strict and liberal, although each is subject to
numerous modifications. The latter is frequently employed as a
cloak for the achievement of a desired result, actually by no
identifiable legal "method" at all, from the application of a
statute which has failed to legislate that result. It is submitted
that both should at once be discarded in favor of the "plain
meaning rule" as herein advocated. The search for legislative
intent should' be confined primarily to that area where such intent is effectively expressed, to wit, the words of the statute as
finally enacted. On principle, if the legislature fails to give expression to its intent completely and accurately in the statute,
t is and should be the duty of the legislature, and the legislature
alone, to supplement or correct.
Thus the ultimate goal would be to confine the operation of
any statute to matters definitely within its terms, that is, cases
which fall plainly and clearly within the natural meaning of the
actual language used.4 Where the language is unambiguous, that
' Tis is sometimes done in criminal cases. United States v.
Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 81 L.Ed. 127, 57 Sup. Ct. 126 (1936).
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should end the matter even though extrinsic evidence might support an argument that the actual language does not reflect the
intent of the legislature. Where the language is ambiguous, the
court should look first within the four corners of the statute m
attempting to resolve the ambiguity Only if it cannot be thus
resolved would the concession already made enable the court to
review legislative history, and if the legislative intent does not
then emerge with unquestionable clarity, the court should decide the particular case as if no statute had been enacted, leaving it to the legislature to take further action if it wishes.
It is recognized that the trend today seems to be in the direction of so-called "liberal construction. "5 One court has said
that a liberal construction seeks to arrive at the legislative intention through ascertaining the chief purpose of the statute, its
context, subject matter, and consequences, rather than from the
strict import of the words used.0 This description of liberal construction shows on its face that elements of uncertainty, which
may be highly subjective, are introduced the instant a judge
decides to interpret a statute "liberally " If liberal construction
were confined to resolving ambiguities in favor of giving effect
to the expressed purpose of the legislature, it would not be too
objectionable, but its operation should be confined to instances
where an ambiguity is plainly apparent, the purpose of the
statute itself is equally apparent, and such purpose is broad and
clear enough to resolve all doubts created by the particular
ambiguity
Opponents of the "plain meaning rule" attack its type of
approach as being narrow and as preventing the courts from
determining the "true meaning" of a statute. However, among
other things, they usually fail to consider that even a statute
winch is subject to strict construction is nevertheless entitled to
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a
statute should be read in such a way as to carry out Congressional
intent despite a contrary literal meaning. Markham v. Cabell, 326
U.S. 404, 90 L.Ed. 165, 66 Sup. Ct. 193 (1945) United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, Inc., 315 U.S. 50. 86 L.Ed. 671, 62 Sup. Ct. 445

(1941)

United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310

U.S. 534, 84 L.Ed. 1345, 60 Sup. Ct. 1059 (1940), United States v.
Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 84 L.Ed. 1356, 60 Sup. Ct. 1034 (1939)
1State ex rel. Schroeder v. Morris, Mayor, 199 Ind. 78, 155 N.E.
198 (1927).
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a fair construction with the words being given their ordinarily
accepted meaning.
Proponents of "liberal construction" argue that it enables
'the court to give statutes a "beneficial operation" and one which
will promote "justice." This may have an attractive sound, but
among other things it should be considered how "just" it is to
"interpret" a statute favorably for one litigant when in every
case there is an equally important opposite interest involved.
One sometimes almost suspects that the attitude of opponents of the "plain meaning rule" may be a result of some
underlying mistrust of laws made by popularly elected legislatures. Perhaps it would be unfair to characterize their position
as another way of saying that legislative power should have
been given to the courts in the Constitution, but, since it was not,
the courts should nevertheless usurp it in the interest of "justice." It is recognized that the Constitution, or at any rate state
constitutions, probably contemplated that the courts may continue to exercise quasi-legislative functions in the development of
principles of common law and equity, but it is submitted that
such functions should not be carried over into the field of statutory law.
In most cases where application of the "plain meaning
rule" would give a result which advocates of liberal construetion would consider non-beneficial, it will be found either that
the legislature did not have in mind the factual situation presented or that the legislature intended not to legislate with respect to such factual situation. If the latter is the case, it seems
abundantly clear on any theory that the courts should not attempt to contravene the legislative intent. If the former is the
case, the courts should not attempt to conjecture as to what the
legislature would have done unless (a) the legislative intent and
purposes have been clearly expressed in the statute itself, (b)
the actual wording of the statute is sufficiently general to permit the courts to supply the omission, and (e) only one result
consistent with the expressed legislative purpose can be reached.
Surely the best rule is to stick to the "plain meaning rule" as
herein advocated, even if the court thinks the legislature should
have made the statute more comprehensive. The courts defi-
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nitely should not speculate on the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. It would be no intolerable burden on
our law-making bodies to insist that they declare the purpose and
intent of each statute in plain language, and in so doing, render
unnecessary wild protracted quests by the courts of this elusive
conjectured intent. Reorientation should be in that direction,
with a.vNiw ultimately to withdrawing entirely that part of the
concession heremabove made which permits a review of legislative- history in certain circumstances.
There is undoubtedly a good deal of confusion in the courts
today as to the proper method of going about interpreting statutes. On the whole it is believed that the line of demarcation between the "plain meaning rule," as herein advocated, and most
methods actually being employed is not as pronounced as some
courts and text writers are inclined to believe, -and therefore
the approach herein advocated would involve no revolutionary,
but merely a highly salutary, change of trend. Basically, it is a
question'of emphasis. The tendency has been to mimmize the importance of literal interpretation. That tendency should be reversed.
The inconsistencies of the courts have been marked. To illustrate the difficulties in which deviation from the "plain meaning rule" may place the courts (and a fortiort, lawyers attempting to advise on the effect of a given enactment), one may
contrast Uizited States v Rosenblum Truck fInes with Camszetti v United States.8 Both were Supreme Court cases.
In the Rosenblum case the appellees, on and prior to the
critical date set forth in the applicable statute, were engaged in
the business of hauling for common carriers, but priicipally
for only one carrier. The statute provided that so-called "grandfather rights" were to be given to those carriers engaged in such
operations on the critical date.9 Later, after the critical date,
the appellees ceased hauling for common carriers and began
hauling for individual shippers in their own right. The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the appellees did-not
315 U.S. 50, 86- L:Ed. 671, 62 Sup. Ct. 445 (1941).
' 242 U.S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1916).
' 49 STAT. 543 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. secs. 306 (a) or 309 (a) (Supp.
1946).
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qualify as carriers by motor vehicle within the meaning of the
MIotor Carrier Act of 193510 and, therefore, were not entitled
to a certificate or permit under the "grandfather clause" of that
Act. Appellees, basing their argument on the precise wording
,of the statute, contended that they were entitled to such permit
and the lower court sustained their contention. However, in reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court stated that in any
problem of statutory construction, the intention of the enacting
body controlled, and that in this case, Congress had set forth
broadly in the declaration of policy that the essence of transportation by motor carriers in the public interest was to achieve
adequate, efficient, and economical service, and that Congress
,did not intend to confer these "grandfather rights" on the basis
,of a single transportation service to the public. Thus where the
plain meaning of the words used produced a result plainly at
-variance with the policy of the legislature, the Court gave effect
to what it conceived the Congress intended to provide rather
than to the literal words Congress employed. Yet, in the prey,ousWv decided Canunetth case, supra, where the plain meaning
of the words used in a statute also produced a result plainly at
variance with the policy of the legislature, the Court refused to
give effect to what was most persuasively shown to have been
the intent of Congress and applied the literal words Congress
had employed. In that case the Court was dealing with the provision of the Mann Act which provided in effect that any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported,
in interstate or foreign commerce, any woman or girl for the
purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine, or imprisonment, or both."'
The Court upheld the conviction of defendant despite the fact
that (1) it was plainly proven that the act of defendant in transporting a girl across a state line for immoral purposes was in no
wise an interstate commercial transaction, there being no compensation involved, and (2) the author of the Mann Act personally had stated in the Congressional debates that the purpose
,of the act was the suppression of commercialized vice.
1049 STAT. 543 (1887), 49 U.S.C.A. sec. 1 (1929).
"136 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U.S.C.A. see. 398 (1927).
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Viewed separately, these two cases may well yield "beneficial" results, but it is not easy to reconcile the methods of interpretation. It would appear from these (and other) cases that
courts sometimes determine upon a result, and then supply the
"reasomng" for it. It is not intended to say that this necessarily
results in obvious "ijustice," because we are frequently fortunate in having men of high ideals and integrity as members of
our judiciary But the net results are still to render void and
nugatory much of our written law, to substitute therefor judicial
discretion, and, as stated in the beginning, to aggravate the difficulties of lawyers and laymen. Consistency is non-existent, and
written words become undependable and unpredictable decoys
rather than the guides they are meant to be.
It is submitted that the old terms, liberal construction and
strict construction, have lost a great deal of their content. One
might even venture to suggest that "liberal construction" has
never had any accurately definable content, while even so eminent an authority as Sutherland was faced with the phenomenon
that strict construction may vary in "degree of strictness.' "12
To say the least, the old terms are confusing, and the confusion
is hardly dispelled by such statements as the following, made by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Franklin County Coal Co., Inc.
13
strict construction is not
"
v. Amies, Director of Finance
an exact antithesis of liberal construction." Again, it has been
4
said that a statute strictly construed is confined to its purpose.i
The nnplicatmon as to the meaning of liberal construction is
positively frightemung. Nor is the situation helped by the language of such cases as Miller, Collector of Internal Revenue v
Standard Nut Margarine Co.,15 wherein the court stated that
tax laws are to be interpreted "liberally" m favor of taxpayers.
In that case, the Court called it a "liberal interpretation" of a
statute to refuse to extend its operation beyond the clear meaning and import of the words used. In other words, it was
"liberal" to refuse to extend the statute to a matter which was
definitely not within its written terms. How much simpler it
"SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, sec.

347 (1891).

"359 Ill. 178, 194 N.E. 268, 269 (1934).

"United States v McElvam, 272 U.S. 633, 639, 47 Sup. Ct. 219,
71 L.Ed. 451 (1926).
":284 U.S. 498, 52 Sup. Ct. 260, 76 L.Ed. 422 (1932).
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would have been merely to adopt the plain meaning. The recommendation here is to drop both terms in favor of the "plain
meaning rule."
Merely adopting new terminology, however, will of course
not solve the problem. For example, Kentucky supposedly advocates the "plain meaning rule"I and yet, in a recently decided
case, the Court of Appeals developed at length the legislative and
judicial history of the statute there involved before applying
17
the plain meaning.
The importance of the problem was recently pointed up by
two decisions of the Kentucky Court of Appeals interpreting
the State's constitutional provision of a $5000 yearly salary
limit for all "public officers" other than the governor.1 s These
very interesting cases rested upon the interpretation of the one
term, "public officers." In 1942, the court held that while certain employees of the state, including professors at the state
university, were not "public officers," nevertheless the Constitutional Convention could hardly have intended that mere
employees should receive greater compensation than public officers and, therefore, the salary limit applied to such employees.1 9 Reversing itself late in 1947, the court held that the term,
"public officers," should be given its plain meaning, and therefore employees (at least employees who are professors at the
state university) are not subject to the salary limit.20 In the
meantime, during a period of increasing incomes and prices all
over the nation, the university had suffered seriously by not
being able adequately to meet competition from other institu2
tions for teaching personnel. '
"Hurry Up Broadway Co. v Shannon, 267 Ky. 302, 304, 102
S.W 2d 30, 31 (1937) There the court stated, "It is a cardinal rule

of construction of statutes that where the language of the statute

is free from ambiguity, the exact language of the statute will be fol-

lowed." See also Note (1947) 35 Ky. L. J. 352.

"Department of Revenue v McIlvain, 302 Ky 558, 195 S.W 2d
63 (1946).
" Talbott v Public Service Commission, 291 Ky. 109, 163 S.W
2d 33 (1942) and Pardue v Miller, 306 Ky 110, 206 S.W 2d 75
(1947)
"Talbott v Public Service Commission, 291 Ky 109, 163 S.W
2d 33 (1942).
'Pardue v Miller, 306 Ky 110, 206 S.W 2d 75 (1947).
21

It is not intended to imply that the "plain meamng rule" as

herein advocated should be applied to the interpretation of constitutions as distinguished from statutes. It is recognized that there are
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The problem of statutory interpretation has been discussed
pro and con by various writers in recent articles.2 2 The import
of this note has been merely an argument for a methodical, predictable, and uniform approach to the problem. It seems almost
self evident that no uniformity or predictability in interpretation can be obtained otherwise than on the basis of primary emphasis on plain meaning. It is not disputed that men (even
judges) will differ in their personal opinions on almost any
given problem as a matter of course. No two individuals are
fundamentally alike in their thought processes, and as a natural
result. they seldom arrive at exactly the same conclusion. This
is especially true'when the dispute is as to what is "just" or
*'beneficial." But the existence of such differences of opinion
(e.g.. as to the "true meaning" of a statute) should not be permitted to render doubtful ab mnitia the application and operation
of all written law. The area of dispute should be progressively
confined rather than constantly widened.
It is believed that bench and bar should at once take stock
of the present state of the law relative to this problem. It is not
thought desirable that legislatures be called upon to enact statutes attempting to require the courts to adopt and adhere to the
"'plaii meaning rule." Tis is a job for the courts themselves.2 3
important considerations in connection with the interpretation of
constitutions which are not present in the interpretation of statutes.
As it happens, the provision relating to the salary limit discussed in
the text of this note, though embodied in a constitution, is really
statutory in its essential nature. It is therefore thought to be a useful
example, at least by way of analogy However, it is recognized that
difficulties may be created where such essentially statutory material is incorporated into constitutions, and it is not the purpose of

this note to explore these difficulties or make any recommendation
with regard to constitutional interpretation in general.
2 de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes
(1940) 88 U. oF PA. L. REV. 527" Horack, In the Name of Legislative

Intention (1931) 38 W VA. L. Q. 119; Jones, Statutory Doubts and
Legislative Intention (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 957" Jones, The Plain
Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes (1939) 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2; Radin, Statutory Interpretation
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 863.

1 There is nothing new in the idea that courts should exercise
"self-discipline" when tempted by the "beneficial"
result which
might follow from judicial legislation. The books abound with statements such as the following, by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in McManus & Henry v Cassidy, 66 Pa. St. 260, 262 (1871) "With
a great desire to sustain this judgment, we find ourselves unable to
do so without assuming legislative powers." In Cohn v Cohn, 310
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The most elementary principles of jurisprudence support the
proposition that, along with being just, our laws, especially our
statutory laws, should be certain and their applications predictable.
It is, of course, not denied that there are weaknesses in the
"plain meaning rule," but they can, and should, all be elinnnated in due time by the agency which is both originally and
ultimately responsible for all statutory law, namely, the legislature, precisely along the lines recently suggested by Tur. Justice
Frankfurter in a lecture before the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York when he said, in effect, that although
words are clumsy tools, they are the only tools the legislatures
have and, therefore, the pressure on the legislatures should be
increased in order to compel them to attain more exactness in
their use of words as well as perfection of draftmanship. 24 In
the meantime, it is not denied that the "plain meaning rule" '
must be subject to the limited concessions set forth at the beginning of this note in cases where statutes are imperfectly
drafted. It is not claimed that the "plain meaning rule" is se
nearly perfect as to make possible complete certainty and sure
predictability as to the application of every statute to every
factual situation, but it is believed that it will enable the courts
and the public to come far closer to the attainment of this ideal
than will other approaches which writers in recent years have
been suggesting.
In conclusion, the "plain meaning rule" requires a reasonable interpretation and of course permits words to have their
fullest meaning, and as a natural result it gives statutes effect
according to the natural and obvious import of their language,
without resorting to forced or wholly fictional constructions for
the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. It
does not require restricting the words of a statute to their nar
rowest meaning, but does refuse to extend the law by implication from factors surrounding the enactment. Generally, the
Mass. 126, 37 N.E. 2d 260 (1941), the court stated, 'We cannot add
a provision to a statute which the Legislature did not deem expedient to embody therein."
I Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 2
THE RECORD OF THE AssoCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW

YORK 213 (1947).
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bringing in of extrinsic evidence and opinions will serve only to
create doubt and ambiguity rather than diminish it. Everyone
desires that statutes be workable, just, and beneficial, but this
desire should not be used as a cloak for the judicial re-writing of
statutes. The legislature's powers should not be usurped nor its
responsibilities evaded. The "plain meaning rule" as herein advocated appears to come closer to achieving a desirable compromise among all the desiderata of statutory interpretation than
any other approach. The courts have had no difficulty m consistently holding that federal tax statutes are never retroactive
unless there is a declaration to this effect that is "clear, strong,
and imperative.' '25 Why not apply similar reasoning in interpreting all statutes and permit their plain meaing to be departed from or extended only when the legislative intent is clear,
strong, and imperative 9
CHARLES A. SITnER

'United

States v. Burr, 159 U.S. 78, 82-83, 15 Sup. Ct. 1002, 40

L.Ed. 82 (1895)
L. J.-6

